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Recent studies on environmental regimes suggest that important lessons and policy recom-
mendations may be drawn from the functioning of the multilateral trading regime.1 This 
brief compares the needs and goals of the trade and environment regimes, and discusses 
how insights from over sixty years of experience of the multilateral trading system might 
provide ideas for redesigning the architecture of the international environmental regime. It 
further calls for a better dialogue and improved complementarities between the two fields 
in order to enhance coherence within international law.2
I. The trading regime
Achievements of the trading regime
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system, created following World War 
II, ‘multilateralized’ bilateral tariff concessions between member states through the prin-
ciple of most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment. This principle meant that all participat-
ing actors enjoyed the same market access opportunities as those negotiated among the 
dominant trading nations. The GATT system led to a substantial lowering of tariffs and thus 
to an increase in trade in goods in the second part of the 20th century. During the last suc-
cessfully concluded round of trade negotiations (Uruguay Round, 1986–1995), the regime 
expanded in scope to include partial liberalization of trade in services and protection of 
intellectual property rights, while trade in goods was further liberalized by tackling non-
tariff barriers and subsidies. In brief, the multilateralization of tariff and non-tariff policies 
and law through the MFN principle entailed a progressive liberalization of trade in goods 
and services. 
 
Tariff Reductions in the Industrial Sector
Weighted average tariff rates 
(developed GATT Contracting Parties)
Source: BBl 1994 IV 134
Uruguay Round 
1986-93 (117)
Tokyo Round 
1973-79 (99)
Kennedy Round 
1964-67 (62)
Dillon Round 1960-
62 (26)
Geneva 
1956 (26)
Torquay 
1950-51 (38)
Annecy 
1949 (13)
Foundation of 
GATT, Geneva 
1947 (23 countries)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 
Multilateral cooperation in trade 
has pointed the way towards 
enhanced economic growth, 
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The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 
established one of the most legalized dispute settlement sys-
tems in world politics.3 This system increased compliance with 
international trade rules, and helped buffer against the protec-
tionist tendencies particularly prevalent in times of economic 
downturn. Based on the principle of non-discrimination, the 
WTO provides for equal conditions of competition. Multilater-
al cooperation in trade has pointed the way towards enhanced 
economic growth, and in addition ensures transparency and 
predictability within the trading system. 
Modes of negotiation
Historically, certain negotiation modes played a crucial role in 
the development of the trading regime:
 Limited membership: The GATT began with a limited mem-
bership of 27 states, and increased membership only over 
a long period of time. The WTO comprises 153 members. 
Universal membership does not exist currently, and would 
only be achieved as the result of a long negotiation process.
 Progressive liberalization: The structure and design of WTO 
negotiations allow members to progressively extend mar-
ket access in accordance with their development situa-
tion. The process of progressive liberalization is advanced 
in each negotiation round through bilateral, plurilateral 
and multilateral negotiations directed towards increasing 
the general level of specific commitments undertaken by 
member states.
 Consensus principle: Although the WTO Agreement sets 
out detailed voting rules, they are not applied even when 
consensus fails. Instead, negotiations are undertaken in 
formal and informal committees and decisions reached on 
the basis of consensus of those Parties that are present at a 
meeting.4
 Package-deal negotiations: Package deals entail indivisibly 
bundling together sets of issues in ways that are acceptable 
to all members. However, heavy packages may result in de-
fensive posturing by negotiators, as countries often face pres-
sure from domestic interest groups to veto certain proposals 
where their “national interests” are at stake.5 Package-deal 
negotiations are typical of multilateral trade rounds and 
were crucial for the creation of the WTO, where countries 
had to accept (with some exceptions) all key agreements in 
order to join the new organization.6
 Critical mass approach: Critical mass negotiations are sec-
toral initiatives leading to plurilateral agreements, whereby 
only those WTO Members that together are responsible for 
a major percentage or ‘critical mass’ of world trade in a spe-
cific market take on new obligations. 
Current challenges of the trading regime
In spite of the successes that have been achieved in the trading 
regime, further progress on negotiations has been stalled since 
the so-called Doha Round started in 2001.7 The reasons for this 
are manifold:
 Increasing multipolarity: During the Uruguay Round, a 
Transatlantic partnership between the US and the EU domi-
nated the system, with Japan and Canada acting as systemi-
cally important middle powers supporting the Transatlantic 
leadership. In recent years, we have witnessed the ascent of 
a number of new economic powers, such as China (which 
joined the WTO in 2001), Brazil and India.8 This structural 
change creates new types of collective action problems and 
brings actors with increasingly diverging economic and po-
litical interests to the core negotiations. 
 Limits of consensus diplomacy: The consensus principle gives 
a de facto right of veto to all WTO members. While the great 
political cost of blocking decisions in political processes 
means that in practice, it is only the large players which ex-
ercise this veto power,9 the WTO nevertheless cannot move 
faster than the collective ambition of its members will allow. 
In light of a substantial increase in (active) membership, the 
consensus approach seems to have reached its limits, as the 
multiplying number of potential veto players makes it diffi-
cult to achieve a balance of results which is acceptable to all 
participating actors. 
 Lack of effective graduation: The concept of graduation is 
based upon the philosophy that while all members are 
bound by general principles and rules, more detailed com-
mitments should be commensurate with levels of social and 
economic development and competitiveness on world mar-
kets.10 It builds upon the idea of individual commitments 
listed in schedules for goods and services, and applies it to 
non-tariff barriers and to trade remedies more generally. Al-
though the WTO Agreements contain provisions on special 
and differential treatment with special rights for developing 
countries, the WTO lacks an effective graduation system for 
changing the status of developing countries and countries in 
transition.
 Legalization: The establishment of the WTO’s highly legal-
ized dispute settlement system has had a significant impact 
on the relationship between rule-making and adjudication. 
During the ‘legislative’ stage of negotiation rounds, deci-
sions are still taken by consensus, but there is no power of 
veto in the ‘adjudication’ stage of dispute settlement, where 
members are subject to majority ruling (negative consen-
sus). Decisions taken in the process of dispute settlement 
are difficult to review in succeeding legislation. Realising 
that this structure means decisions on international trade 
law have long-term implications, a growing number of par-
ticipants have adopted more pre-emptive defensive tactics 
and posturing in trade negotiations.11 A balance could be 
restored by enhancing the potential for legislative action 
and response, for instance by introducing a hierarchy of 
sources of law within the WTO, with a number of regula-
tory levels and varying rule-making processes.12  
 Fragmentation: In light of the difficulties with current negoti-
ations on the Doha Development Agenda trade round, many 
members have turned their attention to “new regionalism”. 
They are actively exploring partial liberalization of markets 
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and related economic objectives through other avenues 
such as bilateral preferential trade agreements (PTAs) or 
sector plurilateral agreements (e.g. the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA)). The proliferation of such agree-
ments has led to a fragmentation of authority in the previ-
ously fairly centralized trade regime.
II. Comparing trade and environment
Seeking to apply lessons from the multilateral trading system 
to environmental law and policy begs a basic question – to 
what extent is the nature of rules and commitments in the two 
spheres comparable, and to what extent therefore can these is-
sues be dealt with in a comparable manner?
The excludable nature of international trade regulation
The multilateral trading system has been built with the aim of 
creating a level playing field.13 It is politically based on reciproc-
ity, with all parties required to make appropriate contributions 
for negotiations to succeed. The motivation to engage in nego-
tiations, or to refrain from engaging, is essentially commercial 
interest. Enhanced market access is paid for, in a mercantilist 
manner, with trade concessions offered on an MFN basis.
Negotiations on tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade all fol-
low the same patterns of interfacing the import and export 
interests of domestic industries. Governments, moreover, are 
subject to clear external pressures, which often allow them to 
make decisions which would be impossible in a purely domes-
tic context.
International trade law and trade regulation deal with exclud-
able goods and services, and so are based upon privileges ob-
tained in the process of negotiations and especially reflecting 
particular interests of industries; whereas the overall system 
offers the quality of a global public good, providing legal secu-
rity and protection against state failures and arbitrary discrimi-
nation.
The non-excludable nature of international environmental 
law 
International environmental law, on the other hand, is mainly 
concerned with the regulation of the interaction of humanity 
and the natural environment. Its objectives include pollution 
control and mitigation, preservation of natural habitats, sus-
tainable use of resources and sound waste management. Its 
subject matter directly affects economic and developmental 
issues, such as adaptation to climate change, land use or infra-
structure, and forms therefore an immanent part of sustainable 
development.
The goals of environmental law are long-term and deal with 
public or common goods, both of which are non-excludable in 
nature.14 The advantages these goods provide generally benefit 
all concerned, and therefore the incentive for those affected 
by environmental measures to engage is inherently limited, as 
benefits are shared with the public at large – in short, environ-
mental goods often present a commons-type problem. Opera-
tors subject to environmental regulation generally do not ob-
tain particular benefits in return (although it may be argued 
that such regulations may foster long-term competitiveness in 
the industries affected).
Prerequisites for interfacing trade and environmental 
architectures
While the multilateral trading system does produce an im-
portant public good in terms of institutions and legal security, 
trade diplomacy and the WTO system continue to be primarily 
based upon the interests and incentives for members and their 
industries to participate in the global system. The public good 
produced is the aggregate of the individual interests at stake. 
In the field of international environmental law, the situation is 
exactly reversed. Measures and efforts to protect the environ-
ment primarily entail the production of public goods at differ-
ent levels of governance. Individual benefits are ancillary, and 
are not the driving force behind the pursuit of the defined goals. 
Environmental law does not exclude the provision of particular 
incentives in terms of advantages in competitiveness, but the 
industries concerned often consider environmental regulation 
to be a burden, as they would presumably bear costs for the 
benefit of the public at large. In the absence of clear particular 
self-interests and drivers to engage, motivation to participate 
in an environmental law regime depends, to a large extent, on 
appeal to a sense of ethical and social responsibility.
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… the incentive for those affected by environmental measures to engage 
is inherently limited, as benefits are shared with the public at large…
4The environmental regime’s recourse to multiple policy tools
International environmental law currently employs a host of 
different instruments, entailing both financial programmes 
and regulation. Regulation employs a panoply of different tools, 
including principles, guidelines, prohibitions, charges and 
taxation, conditions, tradable and non-tradable permissions, 
licensing, monitoring, product and process standards, and 
technical norms.15 Apart from fundamental principles, such as 
‘polluter pays’ or the precautionary principles, international 
environmental law largely applies existing legal instruments 
in the pursuit of its goals. Due to the vast variety of available 
policy tools, the mode of implementation of new environmen-
tal obligations is often uncertain at the time of their adoption, 
an uncertainty which may give negotiators and interest groups 
pause. Many of the instruments deployed are instruments of 
trade policy, such as export or import restrictions, product and 
process standards, transparency, and regulation of services. 
Emissions trading deploys financial instruments, and transfer 
of technology and knowledge has implications for intellectual 
property rights. Overall, international environmental law is 
strongly interlinked with international economic law. Its re-
course to trade instruments – as opposed to trade goals – ex-
plains the complex interface between the two fields, and why 
these tools often fall under the jurisdiction of trade panels and 
the Appellate Body of the WTO.16 Its cross-cutting nature also 
explains why international environmental law is inherently 
fragmented and has not so far lent itself to being concentrated 
under the umbrella of a single international organization. 
III. Lessons for the environmental regime
Past successes in the trading regime have resulted from a com-
bination of critical mass and bottom-up approaches, as well as 
the use of incentives to overcome domestic resistance. These 
approaches recognise that states essentially pursue national 
interests and are not willing to commit to actions or regula-
tion unless these interests are directly or indirectly served. One 
major lesson from the trading system, therefore, is that multi-
lateral approaches to the environmental architecture need to 
focus on identifying excludable national interests which may 
be affected in different areas of environmental law and policy. 
It is the imposition of particular disadvantages on those who 
do not participate, or the granting of MFN-based privileges to 
participating members, which creates the incentive to join in-
ternational instruments focusing on the production of environ-
ment-related public goods.
The example of CFCs: The success of the 1985 Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987 Montreal Pro-
tocols (including the 1990 and 1992 amendments) in reducing 
the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in industrial production 
and products is largely attributable to the fact that commitment 
and compliance with the relevant provisions provided open mar-
ket access, while abstainers faced barriers to trade in products 
that were incompatible with the product standards agreed.17
The example of climate change mitigation: In the absence of an 
international system based upon the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), climate policy 
is likely to be focused on regional, national and local measures 
and initiatives. These measures may entail border tax adjust-
ment, carbon tariffs on highly polluting products, or recourse 
to countervailing duties in relation to subsidy programmes. 
The offer by a country to abstain from taking unilateral trade 
measures may serve as incentive to other countries, that have 
not yet committed to climate policies, to participate in a mul-
tilateral system on climate change.18 Membership would bring 
them legal security and predictability, and thus offer them 
more than just the production of a global public good (in terms 
of climate change mitigation) from which they could benefit 
anyway as free-riders.
Lessons may also be drawn from the challenges currently faced 
by the multilateral trading system. The trade regime’s deficien-
cies are to a great extent ascribable to an important shift of 
power in world diplomacy. This stems from the rise of a number 
of new economic powers, affecting the Transatlantic partner-
ship and traditional negotiation structures. The international 
environmental regime faces similar challenges with regard to 
these structural changes. They might therefore be tackled in a 
similar way:19 
 Multipolarity: Highly divergent interests in a multipolar 
world are a concern in international environmental nego-
tiations as well. A critical mass approach would, in combi-
nation with the polluter-pays-principle, allow seeking solu-
tions among the biggest polluters or countries consuming 
the most resources, without negotiations being hampered 
by small players demanding exceptions. In the climate 
change regime, critical mass negotiations make sense for 
mitigation issues, while negotiations on adaptation matters 
obviously need to include developing countries. With regard 
to sustainable public procurement, plurilateral agreements 
among the big players could be an incentive for others to 
join in. 
 Limits of consensus diplomacy: In most international envi-
ronmental negotiations, decisions are usually taken by con-
sensus. However, if negotiation rounds are about to fail in 
spite of widespread agreement because consensus is unat-
tainable, a fall-back strategy is needed, such as, for instance, 
critical mass negotiations.
 Lack of effective graduation: The idea of graduation aims to 
account for the vast differences in social and economic de-
velopment between countries, and is closely related to the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. 
Rather than merely differentiating between industrialized 
and developing countries, graduation could link substantial 
obligations to objective indicators, such as a country’s abso-
lute or per capita CO2 emissions. 
 Legalization: A high degree of legalization may render the 
adoption of new agreements more difficult, since partici-
pants would only commit to what they are sure they are able 
to comply with. On the other hand, this could lead to more 
substantial outcomes. Compared to the highly legalized 
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world trade regime, most multilateral environmental agree-
ments lack strong compliance mechanisms and dispute 
settlement systems.
 Fragmentation: In the absence of any hierarchy among dif-
ferent instruments of international law, including within in-
ternational environmental law, it is important to clarify the 
relationship between existent agreements and institutions, 
particularly if there is an overlap in their thematic scope 
or mandate. It seems crucial to avoid inconsistencies by 
streamlining structures and enhancing central institutions 
like UNEP, which plays an important interfacing and coordi-
nating role.
IV. Dialogue between the two regimes
To enhance coherence within the sustainable development 
framework, it is important to improve the dialogue between in-
ternational trade and environmental institutions. The concept 
of the green economy, for instance, links economic growth to 
environmental factors such as resource efficiency, low pollu-
tion or other environmental costs, and sustainable use of biodi-
versity and its components.20 The concept addresses trade-en-
vironment interfaces, and so can only succeed if convergence 
can be developed between the two regimes at national, regional 
and global levels.
In fact, the multilateral trade regime is increasingly confronted 
with environmental issues in areas such as process and pro-
duction methods, labelling, or valuation of ecosystem services 
and genetic resources. Its dispute settlement system cannot 
address such issues in isolation, and instead has to take into 
account parties’ obligations and commitments under environ-
mental regimes. 
The legal nature of international environmental law, on the 
other hand, calls for an architecture of horizontal legal integra-
tion. Since it uses legal tools pertaining to other areas of law, 
efforts should be made to bring environmental concerns sys-
tematically into the relevant bodies in the process of consulta-
tion, decision-making and implementation. The environmental 
regime needs to make sure that environmental agreements are 
taken into account in other fora, in particular in dispute settle-
ment. This could best be achieved through an anchor institu-
tion (such as UNEP) that is provided with strong procedural 
rights and the competence to mainstream environmental is-
sues in existing institutions of other regimes, such the World 
Bank, the IMF, the WTO, other UN Organizations, and the mul-
tilateral environmental agreements.
V. Conclusion
The development of the multilateral trading system has been 
remarkable for its rapid expansion in membership and scope, 
and for the progressive liberalization of trade in goods and 
services that was achieved under its auspices. Increased mem-
bership, however, entails a number of new challenges, includ-
ing multipolarity, the need for effective graduation, and the 
increasing difficulty and limitation of consensus diplomacy. 
In order to surmount the slowdown in current negotiations, 
negotiation strategies and voting procedures have to be recon-
sidered. The international environmental regime could benefit 
from this review process by applying, where appropriate, the 
more successful negotiation methods such as a critical mass 
approach.
While comparing the two regimes may give some ideas of 
common challenges and possible approaches to surmount 
them, differences between the two fields have to be taken into 
account. Above all, the two regimes differ in their focus with 
regard to the interests they protect, and their degree of exclud-
ability. When comparing the two regimes, it seems reasonable 
to suppose that the identification of excludable goods and driv-
ers in the field of environmental policy and law could create 
incentives for states to join international instruments in that 
field.
Moreover, it is important to enhance the dialogue and coher-
ence between the two regulatory areas in order to avoid ten-
sions and inconsistencies. The institutional setup of interna-
tional environmental governance would have to provide any 
anchor institution with the necessary means to influence the 
decision-making of other institutions, including the WTO, 
when decisions have important environmental implications, 
so as to ensure that all regimes function in a coordinated and 
effective manner.
 Trade  Environment
Interest driven: market access and country-based benefits
Focus on individual benefits; public good in terms of legal security
Reciprocity in terms of political economy
Responsive to domestic and foreign pressure
Excludable nature of trade regulation (benefits limited to participants) 
Incentives to obtain market access and non-discriminatory treatment
Independent nature of the trade regulation system
Strong institutions and legalization
Public goods approach
Focus on the creation of public goods, low priority of individual interests
Non-reciprocity 
Responsive mainly to domestic pressures
Non-excludable nature of environmental regulation (benefits for the 
public at large)
Free riding; limited incentives to participate
Heavy dependence on funding and technical assistance
Fragmented treaty system and weak compliance mechanisms
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